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Piercing the Corporate Veil in Federal
Courts: Is Circumvention of a
Statute Enough?
A strong public policy exists in the United States to protect share-
holders from a corporation's debts. This is accomplished by employing
the legal fiction that the corporation is an entity, separate and distinct
from its shareholders.I The policy is often referred to as "limited liabil-
ity."2 Shareholders are allowed to make capital contributions to corpo-
rations without subjecting their personal wealth to the risks of the
business3 and are subject only to losing the amount of capital they have
actually invested in the corporation.'
In appropriate circumstances, however, the court will cast aside this
legal fiction and disregard the corporate entity, thereby holding share-
holders liable for the corporation's debts. While the rationale for dis-
regarding the corporate entity varies, the decision is supported when to
hold otherwise would promote fraud, illegality, or injustice or would
defeat public policy.' The action taken by the courts has been termed
"piercing the corporate veil."7 In theory, the piercing doctrine applies
1. See H. BALLANTrnE, CORPORATIONS §122, at 293 (rev. ed. 1946); 1 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §25, at 100 (rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]; H.
HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §146, at 251 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN].
2. HENN, supra note 1, §73; Campbell, LimitedLiabiliyfor Corporate Shareholders: Myth
or Matter of Fact, 63 Ky. L.J. 23 n.43 (1974); Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and
Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 262 (1967); Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of
Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 353 (1979).
3. Subscribers and shareholders will normally be liable to the corporation or its creditors for
the full consideration for which its shares are issued. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §25 (1979).
4. These liabilities are essentially for the members' debts, not the corporation's. A. CON-
RAD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE §270 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CONRAD].
5. See Hay v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 863
(1945); Southern Electric Sec. Co. v. State, 91 Miss. 195,207 44 So. Rptr. 785,790 (1907); BA.LLAN-
TINE, supra note 1, §122, at 293; FLETCHER, supra note 1, §41.
6. The classic statement used by many courts was that made by Judge Sanborn in United
States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905):
If any general rule can be laid down in the present state of authority, it is that a
corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient
reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons.
7. IA H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS §295 (4th ed.
1981); HENN, supra note 1, §146, at 250. Other catchwords used by judges include "alter ego,"
"instrumentality," "dummy," "mere agent," "device," "corporate double," and "tooL" Hamilton,
The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REv. 979, 983 (1971). It was precisely such a flood of images and
terminology that prompted Judge Cardozo to declare that the area "is enveloped in the mists of
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to both publicly-held and closely-held or family corporations,8 al-
though case law reveals the doctrine is primarily applied to closely-held
corporations. 9
The decision of when to pierce the corporate veil varies from state to
state"° as well as within the federal court system." Confusion in both
state and federal courts in disregarding the corporate entity is the result
of different tests employed by the courts and different factors required
by the particular tests. 12 The result of this inconsistent application of
the piercing doctrine in the federal courts is of particular significance in
the Medicare program, specifically as it has been applied recently in the
limited area of Medicare's right to reimbursement from extended care
facilities, 3 commonly referred to as skilled nursing facilities. 14 During
the past few years at least five decisions were handed down by federal
courts on the issue of Medicare's right to recoup overpayments from
the shareholders of corporate providers pursuant to Title XVIII of the
Social Security Act."5 Although the factual situations were nearly iden-
tical, application of the appropriate law with regard to piercing the cor-
porate veil was unclear, inconsistent, and confusing."6 Two cases failed
to mention whether state law was to be incorporated into the federal
rule or whether federal common law was to be applied;1 7 two cases
applied state law as the appropriate federal rule;' 8 and one case formu-
lated a federal uniform rule of decision. 9
The purpose of this comment will be to examine the confusion in
federal courts regarding the decision to adopt either the state law as the
controlling federal piercing law or to formulate a uniform rule of deci-
sion. This perplexity in the federal courts will be illustrated further by
metaphor" and that "metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to
liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94,
155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
8. HENN, supra note 1, §146, at .252. However, the general rule becomes less subject to
exceptions as the number of shareholders increases. HENN, supra note 1, §146, at 252 n.12.
9. United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421,424 (D. Mass.
1977) (citing Francis O'Day Co. v. Shapiro, 267 F.2d 669, 673 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1959)); HENN, supra
note 1, §146, at 252.
10. See notes 59-86 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 31-33, 87-94 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 57-62 and accompanying text infra.
13. United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Thomas, 515 F. .upp.
1351 (W.D. Tex. 1981); Woodland Nursing Home Corp. v. Harris, 514 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp. and Rehabilitation Center, Inc,,
511 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1981); 428 F. Supp. at 421.
14. United States v. Gravette Manor Homes, Inc., 642 F.2d 231, 232 (8th Cir. 1981); 514 F.
Supp. at 112; see also 42 U.S.C. §1395x(j) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. See note 13 supra.
17. 515 F. Supp. at 1351; 428 F. Supp. at 421.
18. 514 F. Supp. at 110; 511 F. Supp. at 416.
19. 646 F.2d at 83.
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demonstrating the inconsistent application of the piercing doctrine in
the state courts and the effect of these inconsistencies on the federal
courts' decisions. The focus of this comment will be the piercing doc-
trine as it has been applied to Medicare's right to reimbursement and
the impact of a uniform rule of decision on the piercing doctrine in this
area. This discussion will include an analysis of the need for a uniform
rule of decision, the essence of the uniform rule of decision pursuant to
existing case law, and the potential impact of these determinations on
California corporations. To provide background for the piercing deci-
sion, this comment will begin with an examination of the piercing doc-
trine and the application of this doctrine in the United States.
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
The general rule is that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal
entity, separate and distinct from its shareholders.20 This separation of
legal entity from beneficial ownership has evolved into the principle of
limited liability.21 Although limited liability historically was not a
benefit to incorporating in the United States,22 over the years it has
been adopted primarily to encourage capital growth and investment.23
Today limited liability is fundamental to the law of every jurisdiction. 4
The doctrine of limited liability, however, has been introduced for
purposes of convenience and to achieve justice in a particular situa-
tion. When the doctrine is invoked for a purpose beyond the scope of
this policy, courts will disregard the corporate form and pierce the pro-
tective "corporate veil."26 A corporation and its shareholders will be
treated as one and the same,27 thereby subjecting the individual share-
holders to personal liability for the debts and obligations of the corpo-
20. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
21. See note 2 and accompanying text sufpra.
22. Comment, Inadequate Capitalization as a Basis for Shareholder Liability: The California
Approach and a Recommendation, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 823, 830-33 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Inadequate Capitalization].
23. Inadequate Capitalization, supra note 22, at 830, 833-34; see also Douglas & Shanks, [nsu-
lationfrom Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193-94 (1929); Cominent,
Should Shareholders be Personaly Liablefor the Torts ofheir Corporation?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190,
1190-91 (1967).
24. Krendl & Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Vei" Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DEN. L.J. 1, 2
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Krendl & Krendl]; see Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 758 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
25. Western Battery & Supply Co. v. Hazelett Storage Battery Co., 61 F.2d 220,230 (8th Cir.
1932).
26. In a court of equity, substantial rights rather than mere matter of organization will be
given controlling effect, and disregard of the corporate entity may be invoked if this is necessary to
preserve, protect or enforce such rights. Riverdale Cotton Mills v. Alabama & Ga. Mfg. Co., 198
.S. 188, 199 (1905).
27. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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ration.28 Thus, the courts are torn between two competing policies-
the necessity of limiting liability to promote growth of the corporate
style of doing business and the desire to do justice in a particular case.
29
Since this "piercing" remedy is essentially equitable in nature and re-
quires contradicting the strong public and economic policies of encour-
aging capital growth and investment, the courts reluctantly,
inconsistently, and quite often unclearly determine when to pierce the
corporate veil.30
This inconsistency and confusion in the application of the piercing
doctrine is quite apparent in federal courts.3 1 The source of this confu-
sion, however, is twofold. First, whenever a case is required to be
taken into the federal court system, a decision must be made regarding
the rule to be adopted as the controlling federal law.32 The decision
requires the federal court to apply either the law of the state in which it
presides or to follow other federal cases and formulate a uniform rule
of decision-essentially federal common law.33 Second, if the federal
court determines that state law is to be adopted as the controlling fed-
eral law, further complexities arise due to the inconsistent application
of the piercing doctrine in the individual states. In order to fully un-
derstand the source of this confusion, it is necessary to trace the histori-
cal background of federal common law and its development in the
modem federal piercing dilemma.
THE FEDERAL OPTION: STATE LAW OR A UNIFORM
RULE OF DECISION
Erie ARA Co. v. Tompkins,34 decided in 1938, effectively ended the
regime of federal common law in the area of diversity of citizenship
cases by holding that a federal court was bound to apply state law.35
Erie stated that no general federal common law existed and that Con-
gress had no power to declare substantive rules of common law appli-
cable in a state. 6 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co. ,3 decided on the same day as Erie, however, clearly stated that
federal common law still existed in cases when federal jurisdiction was
28. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
29. Dobbyn,.4 Practical Approach to Consistency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 U. KAN. L. REV.
185, 185 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dobbyn].
30. Krendl & KrendI, supra note 24, at 7.
31. See note 13 supra.
32. United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 85-87 (3d Cir. 1981).
33. Id.
34. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. Id. at 80.
36. Id. at 78.
37. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
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based on a federal question.38 This proposition was clarified five years
later in Cleaqield Trust Co. v. United States.39 The Court held that
when the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts in exercis-
ing a constitutional function or power, absent an applicable act of Con-
gress, the federal courts should fashion the governing rule of law
according to their own standards.40 The enduring contribution of the
Clearqeld holding is its clear establishment of power in the federal
courts to select the governing law in matters related to ongoing opera-
tions of the national government.41
Nevertheless, federal courts often adopt the state law as the relevant
federal rule when to do so is reasonable and no contrary federal policy
exists.42 The decision is a matter of judicial wisdom dependent upon
the nature of the interests involved, as well as upon the impact of the
use of a particular rule on these interests.43 Essentially, the "adoption
decision" requires a balancing test that seeks to determine whether the
federal interests can be effectuated better by adoption of a uniform fed-
eral rule or by adoption of the state rule as the controlling federal
law.44 Courts have articulated various factors to aid in this determina-
tion. These factors include the extent to which: (1) a need exists for
national uniformity;45 (2) a federal rule would disrupt commercial re-
lationships predicated on state law;46 (3) application of state law would
frustrate specific objectives of the federal program;47 (4) implementa-
tion of a particular rule would cause administrative hardships or would
aid in administrative conveniences; 48 (5) the regulations lend weight to
the application of a uniform rule;49 (6) the action in question has a
direct effect on financial obligations of the United States;5  and
38. Id. at 110. Perhaps the language in Erie can be distinguished on the basis of "general
federal common law" as opposed to merely "federal common law." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FED-
ERAL CouNTS §60, at 279 (3d ed. 1977).
39. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
40. Id. at 366-67. But see Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
United States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954).
41. Mishkin, he Variousness of "Federal Law"- Competence and Discretion in the Choice of
National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 833 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Mishkin].
42. United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 907 (1974).
43. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947); see also Mishkin, supra note
41, at 805.
44. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 1193, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
45. United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1981).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 733 (1979); United States v. Dansby,
509 F. Supp. 188, 193 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
49. This analysis is the modem or so-called "implied" preemption approach. See, e.g., Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501-06 (1956); Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 385 n.52 (5th Cir. 1981).
50. Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1270 n.16 (7th Cir. 1981).
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(7) substantial federal interest in the outcome of the litigation exists.-"
Even with the use of these factors, however, whether state law will be
adopted as the federal rule or a unique federal uniform rule of decision
will be formulated remains unclear. The courts have failed to either
mention the applicable law 2 or to state the underlying rationale for
their choice of which law to apply. 3 Moreover, the decision is compli-
cated further since the federal court is faced with the additional di-
lemma of interpreting the particular state's law on piercing before it
can ascertain whether federal interests can be effectuated by its use.
The piercing doctrine has evolved differently in the individual states
and a considerable amount of confusion exists regarding the require-
ments that must be fulfilled to allow for disregarding the corporate en-
tity. 4 This confusion and inconsistent application of the piercing
doctrine among the states amplifies the confusion already existing in
federal courts.
A. Piercing the Corporate Veil According to State Law
Early courts looked directly to bad faith and to the injustice of the
shareholder's conduct towards third persons to justify disregarding the
corporate entity." After 32 years of dealing with the inadequacies of a
rule emphasizing the conduct of the shareholder directly affecting third
persons, courts added a second line of reasoning to their piercing
rationales. 6 This new aspect was an "instrumentality" or "identity"
relationship between the shareholder and the corporation. The end
product in each jurisdiction was a rule that combined two distinct ele-
ments: (1) injustice or inequity in the relationship between the plaintiff
and the shareholder and (2) unity of interest and ownership" between
51. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1980).
52. United States v. Thomas, 515 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Tex. 1981); United States v. Nor-
mandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421 (D. Mass. 1977).
53. Woodland Nursing Home Corp. v. Harris, 514 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United
States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp. and Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 511 F. Supp.
416 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
54. Dobbyn, supra note 29, at 186.
55. Dobbyn, supra note 29, at 185.
56. Dobbyn, supra note 29, at 185-86.
57. California set the stage for other courts to follow in Minie Y. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 487,
202 P. 673, 676 (1921):
First, that the corporation is not only influenced and governed by that person, but that
there is such a umty of interest and ownership that the individuality, or separateness, of
the said person and corporation has ceased; second, that the facts are such that an adher-
ence to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would, under the particu-
lar circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote injustice.
58. This unity of interest element essentially means that the corporation is merely the alter
ego of the shareholders, notwithstanding compliance with all statutory requirements for the crea-
tion of a corporation. IA H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWs
§295 (4th ed. 1981).
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the shareholder and the corporation.59
The confusion in this area today is a result of the various methods
jurisdictions use in defining the importance of these two elements, as
well as the factors necessary to establish their existence. For example,
courts have used a "scatter-gun" approach regarding the unity of inter-
est requirement and have placed each and every available fact which
might possibly indicate unity of interest or control in their opinions,
regardless of its relevance to the particular issue in dispute.6" Conse-
quently, courts espouse numerous tests to justify disregarding
corporateness, 61 while at the same time their rationales are frequently
devoid of substance and dominated by loaded terminology.62 Thus, the
deciding and differentiating factors used in a piercing the corporate veil
case are often impossible to determine.63
New York and California courts appear to be on opposite extremes
regarding the evidence necessary to allow for piercing the corporate
veil.6 Historically, New York has generated many of the most impor-
tant corporate veil cases, and other jurisdictions have followed the re-
strictive view of New York courts toward disregarding the corporate
entity.65 The basic position of these decisions is that the corporate veil
should not be readily pierced.66 In furtherance of this position, New
York and other states adopting this view require a strong showing of
fraud or other improper purpose.67 In an attempt to prove this im-
proper purpose, courts look to various factors such as complying with
corporate formalities, regardless of whether compliance is the cause of
59. Dobbyn, supra note 29, at 187. Compare this analysis with the application of Powell's
three-legged test in Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio RJA Co., 247 A.D. 144, 157-62, 287 N.Y.S. 62,
75-81 (1936).
60. Conrad, supra note 4, §277, at 432; Dobbyn, supra note 29, at 188; see Rosen v. Losch
Co., 234 Cal. App. 2d 324, 333-35, 44 Cal. Rptr. 377, 382-84 (1965); Associated Vendors, Inc. v.
Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 837-42, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 812-16 (1962); Berkey v.
Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
61. In 1925, Professor Ballantine stated that courts usually pierced the corporate veil upon a
showing of(l) agency or (2) the use of the corporation as an instrumentality to sanction a fraud or
promote injustice. See Ballantine, Separate Entity ofParent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL.
L. REV. 12, 20 (1925). Douglas and Shanks in 1929 stated that courts would pierce the veil under
circumstances they categorized as (1) inadequacy of capital; (2) direct intervention which ignores
the normal and orderly procedure of corporate control; or (3) avoiding an inequitable result. See
Douglas & Shanks, Insulationfrom Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193,
218 (1929). For recent attempts to categorize the factors, see Dobbyn, supra note 29, at 190; Ham-
ilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REv. 979, 985 (1971).
62. CONRAD, supra note 4, §277, at 432; Dobbyn, supra note 29, at 189.
63. See notes 60-62 supra.
64. See Dobbyn, supra note 29, at 192; Krendl & Krendl, supra note 24, at 14.
65. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 24, at 14.
66. Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929);
Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 79, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Bartle v. Home
Owners Cooperative, 309 N.Y. 103, 106, 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955); Lowendahl v. Baltimore &
Ohio PKR. Co., 247 A.D. 144, 154, 287 N.Y.S. 62,72 (1936); Krendl & Krendl, supra note 24, at 18.
67. See note 66 supra.
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an injury in question;68 holding a controlling interest in one or more
corporations and handling them so that they have ceased to represent
separate enterprises; 69 and adequately capitalizing the corporation at
the outset to provide for payment of reasonably foreseeable creditors'
claims.7" Although something more than mere ownership or control
must be proven, the improper purpose need not rise to the level of com-
mon law fraud.7'
In comparison, California courts appear to be quite liberal in their
application of the piercing doctrine.72 At least in theory, California is
the only state to rely on inadequate capitalization in the piercing deci-
sion to the exclusion of all other factors and elements, including im-
proper purpose and unjust results.73 In Minton v. Cavaney,74 the
California Supreme Court elevated inadequate capitalization from a
mere factor75 to be considered in the "piercing" decision to an in-
dependent ground for imposing shareholder liability.76 Although Min-
ton was the last case to be decided by the California Supreme Court on
the matter, at least two subsequent California appellate court cases
have retreated from the holding in Minton,77 thereby obscuring the
weight California courts will accord to this theory.78
In Harris v. Curtis,7 9 the court explicitly held that undercapitalization
was merely a factor to be considered,80 along with all other factors
present in the case. The court treated the language in Minton that in-
adequate capitalization is an independent ground for piercing as mere
dictum.8' Notwithstanding that this holding constituted a retreat from
68. De Witt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 1976);
309 N.Y. at 106, 127 N.E.2d at 833; R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS, 210-
15 (2d ed. 1981).
69. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8-9, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 588-89
(1966); Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343, 348 (1947).
70. 540 F.2d at 684.
71. Schattner v. Girard, 668 F.2d 1366, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
72. See Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d, 576, 579, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643
(1961).
73. Id.
74. 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
75. InAutomotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 796-97, 306 P.2d 1, 4
(1957), the court clearly indicated that inadequate capitalization was merely a factor to be consid-
ered in the decision to pierce the corporate veil. Quoting from Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal.
App. 2d 482, 493, 197 P.2d 167, 174 (1948), the court held:
[The proper rule is that inadequate financing, where such appears, is a factor, and an
important factor, in determining whether to remove the insulation to stockholders nor-
mally created by the corporate method of operation.
47 Cal. 2d at 797, 306 P.2d at 4.
76. 56 Cal. 2d at 579, 364 P.2d at 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
77. Pearl v. Shore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 608,95 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1971); Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App.
3d 837, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1970).
78. Inadequate Capitalization, supra note 22, at 824-26.
79. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 837, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
80. Id. at 843, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
81. Id. at 841, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18. The court stated: "Appellants would have us declare
1252
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Minton, the petition for a hearing by the California Supreme Court
was denied.82
A second case, Pearl v. Shore,83 also indicates a weakening of Min-
ton. The appellate court explicitly stated that the requirements of unity
of interest and inequitable result must both be present to disregard the
corporate form. 4 Primary emphasis was placed on the plaintiffs in-
ability to show that failure to pierce the corporate veil would result in
inequities.85 Moreover, in dictum the court referred to Harris and indi-
cated that the issue of whether undercapitalization alone was sufficient
for disregarding the corporate form had not been settled. 6
As a result of the inconsistent approaches the individual states take
regarding the elements and factors necessary to allow "piercing,"
clearly, if federal courts adopt the laws of the states in which they pre-
side as the appropriate federal rule, the piercing doctrine may differ
from state to state even when applied to essentially similar claims. In
addition, a uniform rule of decision on disregarding the corporate en-
tity formulated by federal courts may differ substantially from the law
of the state in which the federal court presides. In order to understand
the potential impact of the federal court applying a uniform rule of
decision as opposed to state law, it is necessary to analyze the substance
of the federal common law piercing doctrine.
B. The Federal Common Law Piercing Doctrine
Once a federal court determines that a uniform rule of decision on
piercing should be applied, the court is then faced with the problem of
identifying what other federal courts have held in the area, and, based
on these judicial opinions, the court must formulate an appropriate rule
to apply to the particular facts of the case. A considerable amount of
confusion exists regarding the applicable federal common law in this
area. Many federal courts simply apply the two elements of the state
doctrine-unity of interest and injustice in the particular situation-
thereby equating the federal piercing doctrine to that applied by the
states.87 One federal court, in the Central District in California, chose
that per se inadequate capitalization renders the shareholders, officers and directors liable for the
obligations of the corporation. They cite no case so holding, and we know of none." Id.
82. Id. at 843; see also Inadequate Capitalization, supra note 22, at 830.
83. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 608, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
84. Id. at 618, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 616-17, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 162; see also Inadequate Capitalization, supra note 22, at
830 n.26.
87. See DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 684-87 (4th Cir.
1976); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634,
637-38 (8th Cir. 1975); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 935, 939-40 (10th Cir. 1975);
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to apply state piercing law to the particular facts based on the premise
that federal law was undeveloped in the piercing area.88 Another court,
in the District of Columbia, found federal law on piercing to encom-
pass a general rule that "a corporate entity may be disregarded in the
interests of public convenience, fairness and equity." 9
Still other federal courts have incorporated the two elements of in-
justice and unity of interest used by the states into a federal rule of
decision, while at the same time adding another element to the piercing
doctrine. Theoretically, this new element alone justifies disregarding
the corporate entity.9" This independent ground for piercing was most
recently articulated as an alternative holding in the federal court cases
of United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc. 9 and United
States v. Pisani,92 wherein circumvention of a statute or avoidance of a
clear legislative purpose was held sufficient to pierce the corporate
veil.9 3 The holdings in these cases allow the corporate entity to be dis-
regarded and permit personal liability to be placed upon the share-
holder or shareholders of the corporation whenever the failure to pierce
would frustrate a statutory aim." The particular statute involved in
both cases required the United States government to be reimbursed for
overpayments made to providers under the Medicare program. 95 The
mere inability of corporations to pay warrants piercing, notwithstand-
ing the absence of fault or inequities. This interpretation is further sub-
stantiated in a recent United States appellate court decision, Town of
Brookline v. Gorsuch.96 There the court stated its understanding of the
general federal rule on piercing to be that a corporate entity may be
disregarded in the interests of public convenience, fairness, and eq-
uity.97 In applying this rule, the court required a close scrutiny of the
Delchamps, Inc. v. Borkin, 429 F.2d 417, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1970); Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267,
272-75 (3d Cir. 1967).
88. United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp. and Rehabilitation Center,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 416, 418 (C.D. Cal. 1981). This decision was based on the holding in Matter of
Christian and Porter Aluminum Co. v. Titus, 584 F.2d 326, 337 (9th Cir. 1978).
89. Capital Telephone Co. v. F.C.C., 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
90. United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 88-89 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Normandy
House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421,424-25 (D. Mass. 1977). Although the law in regard
to this new element was clearly addressed in these cases and their progenitors, there were always
facts sufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil absent the use of this additional piercing ele-
ment. See generally Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bruhn's Freezer Meats of
Chicago, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 438 F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1971); Maley v. Car-
roll, 381 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1967); H.R. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d 819
(1st Cir. 1965); Mansfield Journal Co. v. F.C.C., 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
91. 428 F. Supp. 421 (D. Mass. 1977).
92. 646 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1981).
93. Id. at 88-89; 428 F. Supp. at 424-25.
94. 646 F.2d at 88-89; 428 F. Supp. at 424-25.
95. 646 F.2d at 85; 428 F. Supp. at 42.
96. 667 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 221.
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purpose of the federal statute to determine whether the statute placed
importance on the corporate form.98 The court further held that this
inquiry accorded less respect to the corporate form than the strict com-
mon law alter ego doctrine applied by the state courts. 99
In essence, the decisions of the federal courts in Normandy, Pisani,
and Town of Brookline imposed different requirements on state pierc-
ing doctrines and federal common law piercing doctrines.' The fed-
eral courts, applying a federal rule of decision, required a lesser burden
of proof to disregard the corporate entity than that traditionally de-
manded by the individual states. 0 ' The nearest reference to this cir-
cumvention of a statutory aim as a ground for disregarding the
corporate entity at the state level is the language that a corporation
should be disregarded "whenever justice or public policy demand
it .. ,, "I This broad language, however, is consistently qualified by
the requirement of specific factors which are regarded as essential to
the "piercing" determination. 3 Thus, even though states differ con-
siderably in the application of the piercing doctrine, nothing akin to the
federal circumvention of a statutory purpose as an independent ground
for piercing exists at the state level. The results of the inconsistent ap-
plication of the piercing doctrine in federal courts can be understood by
an examination of the application of the doctrine in the area of Medi-
care's right to reimbursement from extended care facilities pursuant to
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act. °4
MEDICARE AND THE PIERCING DOCTRINE
Recently, five decisions have been published by federal courts on the
issue of Medicare's right to reimbursement from extended care facili-
ties.'0 5 The situations were nearly identical, but the analyses and the
applications of the law by the courts were inconsistent and confusing.
A review of the historical background of the policies and procedures of
the Medicare Program is required to comprehend the factual composi-
tion of these five cases.
98. Id.
99. Id. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
100. See notes 90-99 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 59, 90-99 and accompanying text supra.
102. Tucker v. Binenstock, 310 Pa. 254, 263, 165 A. 247, 250 (1933).
103. See note 61 supra.
104. See note 13 supra.
105. See note 13 supra.
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A. Background on the Medicare Program
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 106 commonly known as Medi-
care, was enacted in 1965 to provide health care services to the aged,
blind, and disabled. 10 7 The program was enacted by Congress for the
specific purpose of providing modem medical care through a coordi-
nated and comprehensive federal health insurance plan.108 The Medi-
care program is substantively divided into two parts.10 9 This comment
will deal exclusively with Part A,011 which provides for hospital insur-
ance benefits through direct payments to hospitals, nursing homes, clin-
ics, or home health agencies for inpatient services."'
In general, under Part A of the program providers of medical serv-
ices are reimbursed by the federal government" 2 for the "reasonable
cost ' 113 of services actually rendered to eligible Medicare benefi-
ciaries.'14 Reasonable costs are the costs actually incurred by the pro-
vider, excluding any part thereof found unnecessary in the efficient
delivery of needed health services." 5 These costs are determined in
accordance with regulations establishing the method or methods to be
used and the items to be included in ascertaining costs for various types
of classes of institutions, agencies, and services.1 6 The overriding pol-
icy to be implemented by the regulations is to ensure that costs attribu-
table to Medicare beneficiaries are not borne by nonbeneficiaries and,
conversely, that the Medicare program does not reimburse providers
for costs which are properly attributable to non-Medicare patients."
17
These actual costs, however, cannot be identified until the end of the
106. 42 U.S.C.A. §§1395-1395ss (West Supp. 1974-1979).
107. Individuals covered under the program include:
(1) individuals who are age 65 or over and are eligible for retirement benefits under
subchapter II of this chapter or under the railroad retirement system; (2) individuals
under age 65 who have been entitled for not less than 24 months to benefits under sub-
chapter II of this chapter or under the railroad retirement system on the basis of a disa-
bility; and (3) certain individuals who did not meet the conditions specified in either
clause (1) or (2) but who are medically determined to have end stage renal disease.
42 U.S.C. §1395c (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
108. Turecamo v. Commissioner, 554 F.2d 564, 571 (2d Cir. 1977); Rastetter v. Weinberger,
379 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.C. Ariz. 1974), a f'd, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975).
109. 554 F.2d at 571.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§1395c-1395i (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Part A is entitled "Hospital Insurance
Benefits for Aged and Disabled." The second substantive section of the act, Part B, deals with
supplementary medical insurance benefits for the aged and disabled. Id. §§1395j-1395w. Part C
of Title XVIII is a definitional section. 42 U.S.C.A. §§1395x-1395ss (West Supp. 1974-1979).Ill. See note 110supra.
112. In reality, the Secretary has assigned the daily operation of the program to "fiscal in-
termediaries." Beverly Enterprises v. Mathews, 432 F. Supp. 1073, 1075 (D.D.C. 1976).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§1395f(b), 1395x(v) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see also 42 C.F.R. §405.402
(1980).
114. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§405.401-405.454 (1980).
115. 42 U.S.C. §1395x(v)(1)(A) (1976); 42 C.F.R. §405.454 (1980).
116. 42 U.S.C. §§1395f(b)(2), 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1976).
117. 42 C.F.R. §405.454 (1980); see also 42 U.S.C. §1395x(v)(1)(A) (1976).
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reporting year, when the cost reports are filed and verified.1 8 Provid-
ers, therefore, must be reimbursed according to an "estimated" cost ba-
sis throughout the year.' 19 These estimated cost payments are made on
an interim basis to providers at least once a month 120 to guarantee that
they have an adequate cash flow and are reimbursed as quickly as pos-
sible.' 2 ' A retroactive adjustment, based on actual costs determined
pursuant to an audit, is made at the end of the annual accounting pe-
riod.' 22 If the audit reveals that the estimated cost basis exceeds the
actual costs incurred by the provider, then Medicare may recover these
overpayments.123 Recoupment of these overpayments by the govern-
ment under the Medicare program has led to numerous controversies
that often result in litigation."2 When viewing these controversies it is
necessary to understand the origin and nature of the claims involved.
B. Current Application of the Piercing Doctrine
The source of the claims involved in Medicare's right to recoup over-
payments from providers confers federal courts with jurisdiction over
the matter.2 5 The Constitution provides that federal courts may be
given jurisdiction over cases in law and equity arising under the Con-
stitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their authority. 126 Clearly, the power to recoup
overpayments under the Medicare program has its origin in the statutes
of the United States and is not dependent on the laws of any particular
state.' 7 Furthermore, the litigation of this matter necessarily raises
questions regarding the unique federal nature of the relationships
involved.12
As previously mentioned, however, whenever a case is heard by fed-
eral courts, a decision must be made regarding the rule to be adopted as
118. 42 C.F.R. §405A05 (1980).
119. Id.
120. 42 U.S.C. §1395g(a) (1976).
121. 42 C.F.R. §405.454(f)(2) (1980).
122. Id.
123. Szekely v. Florida Medical Ass'n, 517 F.2d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
960 (1976); Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329, 337-39 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976); United States v. Thomas, 515 F. Supp. 1351, 1353
(W.D. Tex. 1981); see also 42 C.F.R. §405.454(f) (1980).
124. See note 13 su.pra.
125. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1979); Wallis v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966); United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1981).
126. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
127. 42 U.S.C. §1395g (1976 & Supp. 111 1979); see also 42 C.F.R. §405.405(b), (c) (1980).
128. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); In re "Agent Or-
ange" Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1980); Boyster v. Roden, 628 F.2d
1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 1980) (Each of these cases discussed the unique nature of particular federal
programs.).
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the controlling law.'29 In the application of the piercing doctrine,
choice of controlling law is implicitly, inconsistently, or unclearly
made. 130 For example, in Normandy, the federal district court in Mas-
sachusetts made no mention of which rule was to be the governing law,
ie., the state rule or a federal rule of decision. The court merely articu-
lated alternative holdings' 3 1 without specifying whether the law to be
applied was that of the state in which the court was presiding or federal
common law. On the one hand, the court discussed the alter ego doc-
trine requiring unity of interest and equitable considerations as applied
generally by the states. 32 The court found the facts of the case justified
going beyond the corporate entity and, accordingly, denied the motion
to dismiss.133 On the other hand, the court embarked on a unique ap-
proach to disregarding the corporate entity.134 Specifically, the court
held that the corporate veil could be pierced when failure to do so
would lead to circumvention of a statute or avoidance of a clear legisla-
tive purpose, 35 both of which were present in the case. Although the
court failed to mention whether state or federal law governed, that fed-
eral common law was controlling can be inferred from reliance on this
holding in a later federal court opinion applying federal common
law. 136
In a subsequent decision, U.S. v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent
Hospital and Rehabilitation Center, Inc. , the federal court in the Cen-
tral District of California stated that the alter ego claim was to be ana-
lyzed in accordance with state law.' 38 The court based this holding on
the conclusion of a federal circuit court that since there appeared to be
no special rule concerning the burden of proof in alter ego cases in
federal courts, California law should be applied.139 The court then
stated the necessity of the presence of unity of interest and inequitable
results, as well as various factors to be taken into consideration in de-
termining the existence of these two elements. 40 The court concluded
by holding that in the present situation failure to pierce the corporate
129. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
130. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
131. United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (D.
Mass. 1977).
132. Id. at 424.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 424-25.
135. Id. at 424.
136. This inference is made possible by later reference to the alternative holding of this case in
United Stales v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1981) and in United Slates v. Thomas, 515 F.
Supp. 1351, 1357 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
137. 511 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
138. Id. at 418.
139. Id. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
140. 511 F. Supp. at 418-20.
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veil would be unjust.14 1
The federal court in the Southern District of New York also applied
the state rule as the controlling federal law in the case of Woodland
Nursing Home Corp. v. Harris.42 Although the court explicitly stated
that New York law was to govern the case, it supplied no basis for this
decision. 43 Applying the alter ego theory, the court found that despite
the absence of proof of fraudulent intent, failure to pierce the corporate
veil would produce an unjust result.144 The court did not cease its anal-
ysis here, but continued on to state that "[e]quity and, in particular,
policy considerations under the Medicare statute may provide a basis
for the same result."'145 Moreover, the court cited Normandy and stated
that "to permit Woodland Corporation to avoid liability for Woodland
Associate's debts would be contrary to an important policy underlying
the Medicare program which is to insure that the government not be
charged for more than the reasonable costs of services being ren-
dered." 46 While the court applied New York law to allow for piercing
the corporate veil, inclusion of the language regarding policies underly-
ing the Medicare program as well as the court's reference to Normandy
indicates an awareness of the existence of the federal uniform rule of
decision in this area. 47 Only the federal common law piercing doctrine
places genuine significance on the policies and statutes underlying a
particular program. 4 In addition, it appears that the court in Wood-
land Nursing Home actually used the federal rule to substantiate its
decision to pierce based upon state law.
149
Pisani was the first case to distinguish between the use of state law
and federal common law in the area of piercing the corporate veil and
Medicare's right to reimbursement. 50 In deciding which law to adopt
as the federal rule for the case, the United States Third Circuit Court of
Appeals relied on United States v. KimbellFoods, Inc. ,"' and analyzed
three factors: (1) whether a need for national uniformity existed in this
area, (2) whether a federal rule would disrupt commercial relation-
ships predicated on state law, and (3) whether the application of state
law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program."52 The
141. Id. at 420.
142. 514 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
143. Id. at 113.
144. Id. at 114.
145. Id. at 113.
146. Id. at 114.
147. Id.
148. See notes 90-99 and accompanying text supra.
149. 514 F. Supp. at 114.
150. United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 85-88 (3d Cir. 1981).
151. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
152. 646 F.2d at 86; see also 440 U.S. at 728.
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Pisani court found that state law could frustrate the specific objectives
of the Medicare program to furnish prompt reimbursements to provid-
ers153 and to pay only for the reasonable costs of services supplied.
15 4
Based upon these findings, as well as upon the finding that application
of the laws of the different states would frustrate HEW's only control
for overpayments, 15 - the court held that the formulation of a federal
uniform rule of decision was necessary.1 56 The court then discussed the
contents of this federal uniform rule through the use of alternative
holdings." 7 Initially, the court discussed the alter ego theory as used in
DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Femming Fruit Co.. '" The Pisani
opinion detailed the factors necessary to show unity of interest between
the shareholder and the corporation.'59 Further, the court stated that
the factual situation must present an element of injustice or fundamen-
tal unfairness, 160 thereby equating the federal rule of decision with the
traditional piercing doctrine applied by the states.' 6 1 Based on this al-
ter ego doctrine, the court held that piercing the corporate veil was ap-
propriate.162 As an alternative to this rule, however, the court carefully
rearticulated the holding in Normandy that the corporate veil could be
pierced to prevent circumvention of a statute or avoidance of a clear
legislative purpose. 163 The court found that Dr. Pisani fell within the
purview of this alternative holding as well as the alter ego rationale
since the Medicare statute could be circumvented if he were not found
personally liable. 6
The most recent case decided in this area was United States v.
Thomas. 65 Although the United States district court did not mention
which rule was to be adopted as the appropriate law, the court's refer-
ence to the holding in Pisani166 that clearly applied a federal uniform
rule of decision, infers that federal common law was controlling upon
153. 646 F.2d at 86.
154. Id. at 86-87.
155. Id. at 87.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 88-89.
158. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
159. Factors important to the determination of the existence of an alter ego include: (1) gross
undercapitalization for its purposes; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) non-payment
of dividends; (4) insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time; (5) siphoning of funds of the
corporation by the dominant stockholders; (6) nonfunctioning of other officers or directors;
(7) absence of corporate records; and (8) the fact that the corporation is merely a facade for the
operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders. Also the situation must present an ele-
ment of injustice or fundamental unfairness. 646 F.2d at 88; see also 540 F.2d at 686-87.
160. See note 159 supra.
161. See text accompanying note 59 .wpra.
162. 646 F.2d at 88.
163. 646 F.2d at 88-89.
164. Id.
165. 515 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
166. Id. at 1357.
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the piercing issue. From the holding in Thomas, however, the weight
accorded to the uniform rule of decision stated in Pisani as well as in
Normandy is not evident. The majority of the opinion of the court
focused on the so-called trust fund doctrine and its applicability to the
facts. 167 The court found there were sufficient facts to warrant impos-
ing personal liability on the sole shareholder to the extent the judgment
was not satisfied by the corporation. 61 In the alternative, the court
opined that sufficient facts existed to justify piercing the corporate
veil 16 9 based on the general rule that corporate existence should be dis-
regarded to prevent fraud, illegality, or injustice or when recognition of
the corporate entity would defeat public policy.170 In applying this
rule, the court further stated that pursuant to Pisani and Normandy
circumvention of the Medicare recoupment statute through the insol-
vency of the provider violated public policy. 7' Accordingly, the court
appeared to refer to the federal rule of decision on piercing rather than
to the traditional state doctrines requiring the existence of both unity of
interest and injustice in the particular situation.'72 Nevertheless, the
court also discussed factors from DeWitt Truck Brokers as being rele-
vant to the decision to impose personal liability for corporate debts.'73
This analysis was quite similar to the alter ego alternative holding in
the Pisani decision." The court concluded by holding that the facts
were sufficient to warrant summary judgment on the issue of personal
liability.175 This decision was based on an unclear application of Nor-
mandy accompanied by alter ego factors'7 6 as well as on the trust fund
doctrine.
Although in each of the preceding five cases 7 7 the decision to pierce
was reached, the use of implicit, vague, different, or inconsistent expla-
nations concerning which rule to apply could rapidly lead to inequita-
ble results as well as manipulation of the Medicare system. For
167. Id. at 1356-57.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1357.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
173. 515 F. Supp. at 1357. See note 159 and accompanying text supra.
174. See United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1981).
175. 515 F. Supp. at 1357.
176. In Thomas the court appeared to rely on the Normandy court's interpretation of the pierc-
ing doctrine, and yet the court also discussed DeWitt Truck Brokers. The court in Deitt Truck
Brokers held the decision
to disregard the corporate entity may not, however, rest on a single factor, whether un-
dercapitalization, disregard of corporation's formalities, or what-not, but must involve a
number of such factors; in addition it must present an element of injustice or
fundamental unfairness.
DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 1976).
177. See note 13 supra.
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example, the Pisani and Normandy courts stated that circumvention of
a statutory purpose alone was sufficient to disregard the corporate en-
tity.178 In Thomas the court also appeared to rely on this element,
179
although it is not clear that this reliance was exclusive.180 On the other
hand, the court in Healthwin-Mtidtown Convalescent Hospital applied
the alter ego theory of California.' Likewise, the court in Woodland
Nursing Home applied the alter ego piercing law of New York to the
facts of the case"8 2 and used the uniform rule articulated by the Pisani
and Normandy courts merely to substantiate its decision based on state
law.'8 3 The application of these different rules to the same general fac-
tual situation indicates that the piercing doctrine might be employed
inconsistently."M The issue remains whether the state rule or a uniform
rule of decision should be adopted as the appropriate federal law to
avoid this potential inconsistent application of the piercing doctrine in
the area of Medicare's right to reimbursement.
THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF PIERCING IN MEDICARE'S
RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT
The determination to adopt state law or a uniform rule of decision as
the controlling federal law in regard to piercing and Medicare's right to
recoup overpayments from providers should be based on a thorough
analysis of the relevant factors previously set forth in this comment. 8 5
These factors have been used by federal courts in areas other than
those limited to piercing to decide if the adoption of a uniform rule is
necessary. In essence, the choice of appropriate law involves a balanc-
ing of state and federal interests.
A. Controlling Law: Federal Rule of Decision or State Law
Primary and often competing considerations in determining the need
to formulate a federal rule of decision as opposed to using state law are
the need for uniformity to effectuate the objectives of the federal pro-
gram and the intrusion into established state commercial practices and
relationships." 6 An analysis of the need for uniformity includes
178. 646 F.2d at 88-89; United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp.
421, 424-25 (D. Mass. 1977).
179. 515 F. Supp. at 1357.
180. Id.
181. United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp. and Rehabilitation Center,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 416, 418 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
182. Woodland Nursing Home Corp. v. Harris, 514 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
183. Id. at 114.
184. See notes 177-183 and accompanying text supra.
185. See notes 45-51 and accompanying text supra.
186. United States v. Dansby, 509 F. Supp. 188, 192 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
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strictly scrutinizing the potential frustration of specific objectives of
federal programs, the effect of a particular decision on the financial
obligations of the United States, and the existence of a substantial fed-
eral interest in the outcome of the litigation.
187
The purpose of the Medicare legislation includes ensuring that mod-
em medical care is available on a coordinated and comprehensive basis
to covered individuals throughout the country. 188 The system is
designed to pay providers on a monthly 189 basis as an incentive for
them to participate in the Medicare program. 190 Moreover, providers
are to be paid only for the "reasonable costs" actually incurred in fur-
nishing health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. The return of
overpayments is crucial to guarantee the fulfillment of this goal and to
allow the program to continue to pay providers on an interim, esti-
mated cost basis.191 The federal government has a substantial interest
in maintaining the program's current operating structure.
192
Application of the Medicare program is indistinguishable from na-
tionwide acts of the federal government originating in a single form
from a single source. 193 The scope, nature, legal incidents, and conse-
quences of the relation between providers and Medicare are derived
from federal sources and governed by federal authority. 194 Payments
are made under a uniform statutory scheme, 195 and the only control is
the "day of reckoning" for overpayments. 196 Because of the differences
between state and federal law in this area, 197 if federal courts fail to
apply a uniform rule of decision, this control could be frustrated. 198
Regardless of the state in which the federal court is presiding, the fed-
eral rule of decision on piercing is more lenient than the rule applied by
the states. 199 If federal courts were to apply a uniform rule of decision
187. Id. at 192-95.
188. Turecamo v. Commissioner, 554 F.2d 564, 571 (2d Cir. 1977); Rastetter v. Weinberger,
379 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.C. Ariz. 1974), afl'd, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975).
189. 42 U.S.C. §1395g(a) (1976); 42 C.F.R. §405.454(a), (b) (1980).
190. Monmouth Med. Center v. Harris, 646 F.2d 74, 76 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Nor-
mandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421, 423 (D. Mass. 1977); see also 42 C.F.R.
§405A42(b)(1) (1980).
191. United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1981). The court further stated:
If Congress intended that Medicare be a welfare program for doctors and hospitals, then
the return of overpayments would not be so important. The overpayments would be
going to those Congress intended to benefit. We believe however, that Medicare was
intended solely to assist patients.
Id. at 86-87; see also 42 C.F.R. §405.454(b) (1980).
192. See 646 F.2d at 86.
193. See id. at 76; 428 F. Supp. at 423; see also 42 C.F.R. §405.402(b)(1) (1980).
194. 646 F.2d at 76; 428 F. Supp. at 423; see also 42 C.F.R. §405.402(b)(1) (1980).
195. 646 F.2d at 76; 428 F. Supp. at 423; see also 42 C.F.R. §405.402(b)(1) (1980).
196. 646 F.2d at 87.
197. See notes 63-71, 88-99 and accompanying text supra.
198. See notes 63-71, 88-99 and accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 59, 90-99 and accompanying text supra.
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on piercing in one case and the state piercing doctrine in a similar case,
the results might not be the same.2" Furthermore, if federal courts
adopt the law of the state in which they preside in all cases, essentially
similar claims, although based upon the same statutory authority, could
be treated differently.2 ' The likelihood of this becomes clear when
contrasting the "conservative" piercing doctrine of New York with the
"liberal" piercing doctrine of California.2 °" The application of differ-
ent laws would directly affect the financial status of the United States
by limiting its ability to impose personal liability on the individual
shareholders of an insolvent corporation.0 3 Conceivably, the use of
these inconsistent laws, whether state or federal, involving providers
and the Medicare program identically situated in all relevant respects,
could allow for piercing in one case and not in another. This would
subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional
uncertainty.
204
On the other hand, states traditionally have had a strong interest in
applying their own laws in the area of piercing the corporate veil.
205
The reason for the strong state concern is to promote capital investment
and economic growth within the particular state by employing the legal
fiction that the corporation is an entity, separate and distinct from its
shareholders.20 6 The use of a federal uniform rule of decision will ad-
versely affect the state's ability to apply its own piercing doctrine and to
further its own particular goals. Since the uniform rule of decision ap-
plied to the facts is less restrictive than a particular state's law, this rule
will allow piercing more readily. This will conflict with the state's de-
sire to promote the corporate form of doing business, since the protec-
tion of limited liability would no longer exist in this specific area.
Conversely, the adoption of a special rule could serve to benefit the
states in a significant way. Presently, states with stricter piercing doc-
trines, for example, may be attractive to providers who conduct their
business in a marginal manner2 7-- perhaps bordering on bankruptcy
or insolvency. A uniform rule would put all states on an equal footing
200. See notes 90-99 and accompanying text supra.
201. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1980);
United States v. State Box Co., 219 F. Supp. 684, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1963), a'd, 321 F.2d 640 (9th
Cir. 1963). See notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
202. See notes 64-73 and accompanying text su ra.
203. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 733 (1979); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); 646 F.2d at 87. See note 191 and accompanying text
.supra.
204. See 318 U.S. at 367.
205. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
* 206. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
207. The strict piercing doctrines will make it less likely that the shareholders will be held
personally liable for the corporation's debts and obligations.
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regarding the piercing doctrine as applied to the Medicare program,
thereby protecting a particular state from the abuse of having providers
incorporate there for the purpose of escaping liability.20 8 Further,
those states with more lenient piercing doctrines, ie., those that more
readily subject the corporate members to personal liability, furnish an
incentive for providers to incorporate elsewhere. Under a uniform
rule, the deterrent element would be eliminated and the prospects for
economic growth of a particular state would be advanced.
Another important factor in determining the applicable rule is the
administrative hardship or convenience in using one rule as opposed to
another. In the case of Medicare's right to reimbursement, the ability
of the government to coordinate, administer, and control the 'program
would be enhanced greatly by a uniform rule.20 9 The use of various
state piercing schemes presents a serious danger of conflict with the
effective administration of the federal program by hampering the uni-
form enforcement of the program with sporadic local prosecutions and
undefined guidelines.
2 10
A final important factor is whether the pertinent regulations provide
for specific measures that aid in determining the appropriate rule.211
The comprehensive regulations that implement the Medicare program
demonstrate that the program is to be run on a national level.212 The
scheme of the federal regulations, including guidelines for recouping
overpayments from providers, is so pervasive as to indicate a congres-
sional objective that cannot be attained without the application of fed-
eral common law.213 When Congress has not explicitly spoken in an
area comprised of issues substantially related to an established program
of governmental operation, the holding in Cleafield directs federal
courts to fill the interstices of federal legislation according to their own
standards.214 The federal nature of the issue, in the absence of a stat-
ute, requires that federal judge-made law be applied to resolve the
208. Cf. Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 385-86 (5th Cir.
1981) (The court stated that uniformity of result was not assured by the creation of federal com-
mon law in this situation since identical language in different contracts could be interpreted to
have different meanings.).
209. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1956) (The court examined the danger
of enforcing state sedition acts in regard to the administration of the federal program.).
210. Id.
211. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
212. See 42 C.F.R. §§405.401-405.454 (1980); Cf United States v. Dansby, 509 F. Supp. 188,
194-95 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (The court, applying policy considerations to the FMHA loan program,
reached a contrary result since a uniform federal rule was not necessary to reasonably achieve the
obligations of the program.).
213. Cf. 645 F.2d at 385 (The court held that a contract subject to federal regulation does not
by itself demonstrate that Congress intended federal rather than state law to govern all aspects of
its performance.).
4. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); see also Mishkin, supra note 41, at 800.
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controversy.215
Considering the above factors, ie., the need for national uniformity,
the disruption of commercial relationships predicated on state law, the
frustration of specific objectives of the Medicare program, the adminis-
trative hardship involved by failing to use one rule, the uniform statu-
tory scheme of the program, the direct effect on financial obligations of
the United States, and the substantial federal interest in the outcome of
the litigation, the balance weighs heavily in favor of a federal uniform
rule of decision in this area.216 Although a uniform rule may intrude
into established state commercial practices and relationships and may
conflict with the individual desire of a state to apply their own piercing
doctrines to further their own particular interests,21 7 the decision to for-
mulate a uniform rule may be supported by more decisive factors. The
deciding factor should be the purpose behind a specific program and
the rule that most accurately promotes that purpose.218 Medicare's
right to reimbursement could be severely hindered and the entire Medi-
care system could suffer without the use of a uniform rule. The effi-
cient and effective operation of the program requires the exercise of
judge-made law to protect and to effectuate the dominant federal
scheme.219 The exact parameters of this uniform rule must be ad-
dressed to facilitate understanding of the implications of its use.
B. Federal Uniform Rule of Decision: What is the Rule?
Once a determination is made that a federal uniform rule of decision
should be applied in this area, further examination of Pisani, Nor-
mandy, Thomas, and Town of Brookline, as well as their progenitors, is
necessary to define the substance of the rule. In Normandy, the earliest
decision, the federal district court set forth an alternative holding
whereby the corporate entity could be disregarded when failure to do
so would lead to circumvention of a statute or avoidance of a clear
legislative purpose.220 Although the main holding of the case was
215. 318 U.S. at 367.
216. United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 87 (3d Cir. 1981). See generally Holbrook v. Pitt,
643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981);Inre "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987 (2d
Cir. 1980); Boyster v. Roden, 628 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1980); First S. Fed. Sav. v. First S. Sav., 614
F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980); Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1979); Schlake v. Beatrice Produc-
tion Credit Ass'n, 596 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir.
1967); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Dansby, 509 F.
Supp. 188 (N.D. Ohio 1981); United States v. Chatlin's Dept. Store, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 108 (E.D.
Penn. 1980); City of New Orleans v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 390 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1974).
217. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
218. 646 F.2d at 86 (The most important factor in the adoption decision is whether state law
would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program.).
219. See note 216 and accompanyng text supra.
220. United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421,424 (D. Mass.
1977).
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based on an alter ego theory, the language used by the court makes it
clear that the same result would be obtained in the case under the cir-
cumvention of a statute approach. 21 If the government were unable to
recoup overpayments from the provider, one of the goals of the Medi-
care program would be frustrated-namely, that the government not be
charged for more than the reasonable cost of services rendered. 222 The
Normandy court was not the first court to state that the protective cor-
porate veil could be pierced based on an act which served to undermine
a substantial legislative purpose, absent a showing of the unity of inter-
est and injustice elements normally required.223 Other cases relied
upon by the court in Normandy included Quinn v. Butz,224 Bruhn's
Freezer Meats of Chicago, Inc. v. United States Department of Agricul-
ture,22 Maley v. Carroll,226 HP. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treas-
ury,.227 and Mansfield Journal Co. v. F C C .221
In Quinn, the United States District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals placed primary emphasis on the traditional unity of interest
and injustice requirements." 9 Specifically, the court urged that the
corporate veil be pierced primarily to avoid injustice. 30 Nevertheless,
the court went on to quote from Lambert and stated that regardless of
the importance of the corporate form, it could not be used to stand in
the way of regulatory procedures. 23 1 The Quinn court further quoted
from ManIeld and held that "[tjo carry out statutory objectives, it is
frequently necessary to seek out and to give weight to the identity and
characteristics of the controlling officers and stockholders of a corpora-
tion.''- The court in Normandy interpreted this language to allow
disregarding the corporate entity when an act by the corporation served
to undermine a substantial federal legislative purpose regardless of the
existence of any wrongful conduct. 33 The United States Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reinforced the Normandy interpretation in Bruhn's
Freezer Meats by holding that "an order limited in its application only
to the corporate petitioners probably would prove futile as the corpora-
tions could be dissolved and the individual petitioners could then,
221. Id. at 424-25.
222. Id. at 425.
223. Id. at 424-25. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
224. 510 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
225. 438 F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1971).
226. 381 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1967).
227. 354 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1965).
228. 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
229. 510 F.2d at 758-59.
230. Id. at 759.
231. Id.; see also 354 F.2d at 822.
232. 510 F.2d at 758-59; see also 180 F.2d at 37.
233. United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (D.
Mass. 1977).
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under the cloak of new corporations, engage in the proscribed activities
and thereby frustrate the purposes of the Act."234 The court in Bruhn's
Freezer Meats also stated that "[t]he law is well settled that the corpo-
rate entity may be disregarded when the failure to do so would enable
the corporate device to be used to circumvent a statute."
235
The Maley court focused primarily on .the alter ego theory as a basis
for disregarding the corporate entity. 36 The federal appellate court
held that before equity will destroy rights, "there must be evidence of
clear fraud, use of a corporation as an alter ego, infidelity of a fiduci-
ary, pur.poseful avoidance of a statutory duty, or a similar species of
such genera."''2 Although this language appears to leave room for the
Normandy interpretation that circumvention of a statutory purpose is
enough to allow for disregarding the corporate entity, the requirement
of "purposeful avoidance" of a statutory duty mandates a stricter stan-
dard than that subsequently required in Normandy. According to the
court in Normandy, no fraudulent intent or wrongful conduct was re-
quired. Rather, any act that frustrated a clear legislative purpose per-
mitted piercing the corporate veil.238
The interpretation in Normandy of these cases was later followed in
Pisani wherein the court merely restated the alternative holding in Nor-
mandy. 23 9 In addition, the federal district court in Thomas supported
the use of circumvention of a statute or avoidance of a clear legislative
purpose as an independent ground for piercing by holding that circum-
vention of a statute violated public policy and that the corporate form
should be disregarded when recognition would defeat public policy.
240
Finally, in Town of Brookline, the United States First Circuit Court of
Appeals required the federal courts to look closely at the purpose of the
federal statute to see whether the statute placed importance on the cor-
porate form, an inquiry that gave less respect to the corporate form
234. Bruhn's Freezer Meats of Chicago, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 438 F.2d
1332, 1343 (8th Cir. 1971).
235. Id.; see, eg., Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1945); United
States v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 220 U.S. 257, 259 (1911); Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d
710,717 (7th Cir. 1965); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. F.T.C., 347 F.2d 785, 787 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1965); see also Fletcher, supra note 1, §45 (1963).
236. Maley v. Carroll, 381 F.2d 147, 152-54 (5th Cir. 1967).
237. Id. at 155 (emphasis added). In dictum, the court expressed the proper standard for
disregarding the corporate entity:
While corporate entities may be disregarded where they are made the implement for
avoiding a clear legislative purpose, they will not be disregarded where those in control
have deliberately adopted the corporate form in order to secure its advantages and where
no violence to the legislative purpose is done by treating the corporate entity as a sepa-
rate legal person.
Id. (quoting Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946)).
238. 428 F. Supp. at 424-25.
239. United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 88-89 (3d Cir. 1981).
240. United States v. Thomas, 515 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
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than the strict common law alter ego theory.24 1
Thus, when federal courts apply federal common law in the case of
Medicare's right to reimbursement, they are applying essentially the
traditional state test of unity of interest and injustice in the particular
situation.242 Another element, however, has been added to this tradi-
tional test by the federal courts. This element, circumvention of a stat-
utory objective, serves as an independent ground for piercing the
corporate veil.24 The test is based solely on an interpretation of the
purpose of the federal scheme in order to assure that relevant aims are
not obviated by the actions of corporations and individuals.244 This
single element approach substantially alleviates the government's bur-
den of proof in actions seeking to impose shareholder liability for the
debts of the corporation.245 Consequently, this uniform rule could
have a substantial impact on corporations throughout the United
States. These potential ramifications could be felt even in California, a
state considered quite liberal in terms of disregarding the corporate
entity.
C Impact of A Uniform Rule of Decision on California Corporations
The use of circumvention of a statutory purpose as an independent
ground to justify piercing the corporate veil could seriously affect Cali-
fornia corporations. Applying this federal uniform rule of decision in
cases involving Medicare's right to reimbursement, as opposed to using
the traditional state piercing doctrines, will justify disregarding the cor-
porate entity when a clear statutory purpose is frustrated.246 Nothing
akin to this test for piercing exists at the state-level. 7 Although Cali-
fornia is considered to be liberal in its application of the piercing doc-
trine,248 this federal circumvention of a statute approach to piercing
requires an even lesser burden of proof than that required by Minton
wherein theoretically inadequate capitalization alone was enough to
justify piercing the corporate veil. The potential difference in result is
further amplified by the fact that at least two subsequent California
appellate courts have failed to follow the proposition in Minton .249 The
241. Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (Ist Cir. 1981).
242. See notes 229-241 and accompanying text supra.
243. 646 F.2d at 88; 428 F. Supp. at 424.
244. 646 F.2d at 88; 428 F. Supp. at 424.
245. Marget, Shareholder Liabilio--Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising
Management, Inc.-A Single-Factor Test?, 3 J. CoRP. L. 219, 234 (1977).
246. See notes 90-99 and accompanying text supra.
247. See notes 6, 61, 90-99 and accompanying text supra.
248. See Dobbyn, supra note 29, at 192; Krendl & end spra note 24.
249. Pearl v. Shore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 608,95 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1971); Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App.
3d 837, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1970).
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effect of these two holdings is that the piercing doctrine in California
may not be as liberal as case law has appeared to suggest.
The federal uniform rule of decision on piercing requires finding
only that a statute has been circumvented.250 There is no requirement
that the individual shareholders have dominion over a corporation so
that for all practical purposes the separate personalities are negated,
nor is there a requirement that failure to pierce the veil produce an
unjust result." 1 Furthermore, this rule of decision does not require a
finding that a particular corporation is inadequately capitalized. 25 2 In
fact, the provider corporation may be adequately capitalized, may ad-
here to all corporate formalities, and may be entirely without fraudu-
lent intent or wrongful conduct, and yet the mere inability to pay the
Medicare program may require imposing personal liability on the indi-
vidual shareholder or shareholders.253 As a result, the traditional doc-
trine of limited liability could be significantly weakened in this area.
The implications of this uniform rule of decision easily could be ex-
tended into areas other than Medicare's right to reimbursement from
providers. Although avoidance of a statutory aim, absent a showing of
fraud or other improper purpose, has been perhaps carried to its ex-
treme position in the limited area of Medicare's right to reimbursement
under a special regulatory payment scheme, the language used by the
courts does not confine the use of the rule to this specific area.25 4
Rather, a fair reading of the cases reveals that this uniform piercing
rationale may be used in any situation in which the federal government
is a party representing the interests of a nationwide program.2 5 The
.extension of this rule to other areas could significantly hinder the cor-
porate entity. Conceivably, California would no longer be able to pro-
tect individual shareholders from personal liability in any situation
when the corporation was dealing with a national government pro-
gram.256 The government could control the determination of individ-
ual liability in all areas involving a substantial federal program
through the creation of a comprehensive statutory scheme.257 Califor-
nia corporations would be required to closely abide by the rules and
regulations of these federal programs to prevent circumvention of a
statutory purpose and to guarantee that the individual shareholders are
not held personally liable for the debts of an insolvent corporation.
250. 646 F.2d at 88; 428 F. Supp. at 424.
251. 646 F.2d at 88; 428 F. Supp. at 424.
252. 646 F.2d at 88; 428 F. Supp. at 424.
253. 646 F.2d at 88; 428 F. Supp. at 424.
254. See notes 219-241 and accompanying text supra.
255. See notes 219-241 and accompanying text supra.
256. See notes 219-241 and accompanying text supra.
257. See notes 219-241 and accompanying text supra.
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CONCLUSION
Limited liability has become a concept which is fundamental to the
law of every jurisdiction in the United States. When the doctrine is
used beyond its reason and policy, however, courts will disregard the
corporate entity and hold the shareholders personally liable for the
debts and obligations of the corporation. Confusion surrounds the de-
cision whether the corporate veil will be pierced. Application of the
doctrine varies from state to state, and at times, even within a particular
state. This ambiguity is then coupled with an unclear determination of
whether state law or a uniform rule of decision is to be used in a case
where federal law is controlling. Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of
the problem is an analysis of the factors and elements employed by the
federal courts in their decision to disregard the corporate entity.
This comment has examined the criteria relevant to the decision of
whether state law or federal law should govern in the limited area of
Medicare's right to reimbursement from providers under the program.
The national character of the program, as well as the federal statutory
right to reimbursement, requires that federal law be applied. In ascer-
taining the need for a uniform rule as opposed to using state law, nu-
merous factors have been established and evaluated. Pisani is the
authority in this area and correctly applies a uniform rule of decision as
the governing federal law.
Nevertheless, the real impact of the decision to apply a uniform rule
on the traditional piercing doctrine is dependent upon the substance of
the federal rule. Pisani and Normandy establish that circumvention of
a statute or avoidance of a clear legislative purpose may serve as in-
dependent grounds to justify piercing the corporate veil. This new ele-
ment, existing only in the federal courts, places new importance on the
decision by the federal courts either to apply the state rule or to formu-
late a uniform rule of decision. Since nothing akin to this new ground
for disregarding the corporate entity exists at the state level, particu-
larly in California, the effect of a uniform piercing rule on California
corporations could be substantial. This new uniform rule of decision
allows piercing absent a showing of wrongful conduct, fraudulent in-
tent, inadequate capitalization, apparent injustices, or other traditional
piercing factors. Consequently, the government's burden of proof in a
particular case could be significantly lessened.
Although this uniform rule of decision only has been applied to a
special regulatory payment system under the Medicare program, the
language used by the courts indicates that this uniform piercing doc-
trine could be extended outside of this limited area to encompass virtu-
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ally any situation in which the federal government is a party
representing the interests of a nationwide program. The use of this
piercing rule in areas other than Medicare could have far reaching
ramifications on the corporate style of conducting business. Since the
federal common law rule more readily disregards the corporate entity,
it is conceivable that the doctrine of limited liability will be considera-
bly weakened by the use of this rule. Corporations will be held to a
higher standard in regard to performing their business obligations, at
least whenever they engage in activities involving a substantial federal
program. It becomes extremely difficult to ensure that shareholders
will not be held liable for the debts of an insolvent corporation. Thus,
in an attempt to maintain limited liability protection, officers, directors,
and shareholders of a corporation must closely abide by pertinent rules
and regulations of the various federal programs they deal with in a
corporate capacity.
Patricia J Hartman
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